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THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: AN ANALYSIS
OF PROPOSED REVISIONSt
By LYNN I. PERRIGO::
T HE allegation that the federal courts, following the dicta of
Chief justice MIarshall, usurped the power to review the con-
stitutionality of state and national legislation, has little support in
this day and age, since the exercise of that power for more than a
century has not only established its reality but has also facilitated
in some respects the steady growth of the constitution required by
the trends in the growth and development of the nation.' In the
course of this interpretative genesis of the organic law the courts
have suffered little criticism for upholding the validity of laws;
protests have arisen when laws sponsored by a section or a class
have been annulled. As long as these attacks upon the courts were
sponsored now and then by disaffected minorities, no plan of re-
vision stood much chance of acceptance ;2 but if several minority
groups should be aroused at once and act in unison, the courts
might no longer escape with their prerogative intact. Consequent-
tThis article will appear simultaneously in the April issue of the
Kansas City Law Review. We wish to acknowledge with many thanks
the courtesy of the editors of the Kansas City Law Review in permitting
the double publication.-Ed.
*Instructor in American history and sociology, University of*Kansas
City, Kansas City, Mo.1The genesis of the doctrine of judicial review is described in the fol-
lowing books and articles: Corwin, Judicial Review, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences
457-62; Dougherty, Power of Federal Judiciary Over Federal Legislation;
Haines, American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy; Merriam, American
Political Ideas 1865-1917; Orth and Cushman, American National Govern-
ment; Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932);
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History.
-Criticism in the past has largely been "opportunistic, arising out of
some specific decision." Orth and Cushman, American National Govern-
ment 568; Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 188. A brief
account of past attacks upon the Court is available in Buell, The Supreme
Court in United States History, (1922) 17 Current History 230. There
is a fairly comprehensive bibliography in Ettrude, The Power of Congress
to Nullify Supreme Court Decisions.
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ly the list of congressional acts held unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court suggests that the critical hour may be at hand. Of
the seventy laws annulled to June, 1935, nineteen were invalidated
in the decade of 1920 to 1930; and the present decade promises
even to exceed that record, for ten laws were rejected in the first
half of it. Of these seventy unfavorable opinions, ten were ren-
dered by a five-to-four vote.' This need not mean that the Court
was always wrong and Congress right, but it merely indicates that
the once popular growth of national powers by judicial interpreta-
tion is now being checked to an extent that affects the interests of a
larger proportion of the American people.
The actual number of laws stricken down is really less signifi-
cant than the alleged effect of the practice on legislative objectives
and processes. Prior to 1880 the attacks upon the Supreme Court
grew largely from sectional interests ;4 but in 1888 the Court be-
gan resorting to the "due process" clauses to free business from
regulation.5 Because acts were held unconstitutional in only six of
ninety-eight cases involving "due process" prior to 1912, in only
seven of ninety-seven cases in 1913 to 1920, but in fifteen of
fifty-three cases in 1920 to 1930, Frankfurter has concluded that
this revealed a "destructive tendency."" Corwin has added that
only a few other clauses in the organic law have furnished the
3The prepared lists of unconstitutional legislation do not agree in detail
because of the problem of interpreting the effect of opinions on some com-
plex issues. The figures given above are from an editorial in United
States News, June 10, 1935, p. 1. In 1923 Warren listed sixty laws of
Congress that had been held unconstitutional (cited in Orth and Cush-
man, American National Government 561), while Ralston, writing at
about the same time, found fifty-two (Ralston, Study and Report for the
A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), Appendix A), and Haines listed sixty in
1932 (Haines, American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy 541-66). Also,
compare the list in (1937) 4 West Pub. Co. Docket 3863-71, in which only
fifty-eight cases are included to date, of which only twelve were in the
twentids and four in the first half of the thirties. In 1912 B. F. Moore
found that 185 federal statutes had been upheld as against 33 annulled,
while 646 state laws had been approved and 223 rejected. Of the 33
negative opinions, he found that 7 were based upon a disturbance of the
functioning of the three branches of the government, 12 upon encroach-
ments on states' rights, 11 upon violations of individual liberties, and 6
upon miscellaneous grounds. Moore, The Supreme Court and Unconsti-
tutional Legislation 77-130.
4See footnote 2.
5In 1882 Roscoe Conkling testified before the Court that the "due
process" clause had originally been inserted in the fourteenth amendment to
protect property rights as well as the negro; and in the Pembina Mining
Case of 1888 the Court defined "persons" in the amendment to include
corporations. Hacker and Kendrick, The United States Since 1865, p. 198.
6Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Public, (1930) 83 Forum
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
basis for judicial review, as contrasted with the frequency of
resort to the "due process" clauses in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, with the result that the "higher law" protected by the
Court is really the code of American business today; i.e., "the
freedom of individual enterprise . . ., and the unrestricted flow
commerce throughout the country.'"7 Merriam and Goodnow have
protested that the courts tend to support the political and economic
policies of Big Business by rejecting as violative of "individual
liberties" or "due process" many well-considered plans to resolve
the problems of modern urbanized and industrialized society., As
a result, Merriam found labor to be most distrustful of the power
of the courts, the middle class wavering, and the employers quite
pleased.0
Since the courts generally have followed the rule of precedent,
a judicial decision in a crucial case has determined to a great extent
the future course of courts and legislature. One momentous opin-
ion each on income taxes, child labor, minimum wages, railway
rate-making, and New Deal policies not only served to wreck the
law and the administrative set-up in question but also to make diffi-
cult a whole legislative program of the type invalidated.1" It is
charged, then, that the courts have in a sense become a third legis-
lative chamber, but that they act after the fact."' For example, the
NRA annulment came after the Act had been administered for two
years; and then the unanticipated strict construction in that case
played havoc with the legislative program of Congress, for a half
dozen more statutes that were being drawn or administered then
appeared to be unconstitutional.' 2 Furthermore, the legislature
excuses itself for drawing doubtful laws by recourse to the con-
tention that the courts, by placing emphasis first here and there
7Corwin, Judicial Review, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 462.
8 Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, at pp. 151, 158-69, 176;
Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution 332. Compare Coker, Recent
Political Thought 360; Roe, Our Judicial Oligarchy passim; and editorial,
New Republic, June 12, 1935, at p. 118.OMerriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, at p. 177. A more
severe denunciation is that of Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of
L. (Pamphlet, 1932) p. 40.
"'See Buell, Reforming the Supreme Court, (1922) 114 Nation 715.
-President Roosevelt's radio address, March 9, 1937. Moore listed
twelve cases (to 1912) that had "hampered Congress in the solution of
pressing social and economic problems." Moore, The Supreme Court and
Unconstitutional Legislation 85-102. See also the scathing editorial, New
Republic, June 12, 1935, at p. 118.
1"See The National Whirligig (Washington news comments) in Muncie,
Ind., Evening Press, June 5, 1935, and in other newspapers subscribing to
that syndicated column.
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among precedents and powers, have followed a contradictory course
rather than laid down a clear pattern of rules to guide the law-
makers.13 For example, the interstate commerce clause has been
expanded to permit injunctions against labor in almost any cir-
cumstance, but has been more strictly construed to invalidate child
labor laws and other social legislation.1"
On the other hand, those who support the power of the courts
to weigh the constitutionality of legislation have a number of
strong defensive arguments; but these principles are well known
and generally accepted, so an enumeration of them would be trite.1
Rather, the purpose here is to indicate that the present effort to
"modernize" the federal judiciary has come as a climax in a
period in which many statutes embodying the means to social and
economic objectives sought by an elected President and Congress
have been invalidated because federal judges, charged by their
critics with prejudice for once-prevalent laissez-faire, have found
these laws and their objectives in conflict with a few clauses in the
constitution-clauses that according to some legal scholars have
been expanded and then contracted and have been excessively dwelt
upon. Consequently, from January, 1935, to January, 1936, twenty-
four bills and resolutions seeking revisions of the power or pro-
cedure of the federal judiciary were introduced in Congress."
Finally, in February, 1937, President Roosevelt undertook to co-
ordinate and lead this attack on the judiciary by presenting to
Congress a reform program embodying parts of several plans pre-
viously offered.' 7  In view of the widespread debate and conjecture
"3Clark, The Supreme Court and the N. R. A., New Republic, June
12, 1935, at p. 122; Buell, Reforming the Supreme Court, (1922) 114
Nation 714.
14Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 207.
1Examples of the classical historical defense are: Emery, Concerning
Justice; Dougherty, Power of Federal Judiciary over Federal Legisla-
tion; and Hatcher, The Power of the Federal Courts to Declare Acts of
Congress Unconstitutional, (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 163-7. See also Coxe,
An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation; Borah,
American Problems ch. xv; Haines, American Doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy 480; Otis, It Can Be Done, United States News, Feb. 10, 1936,
p. 3; Sutherland, Shields and Dawes, quoted (June, 1923) in 2 Cong.
Digest 271, 273, 275; Laski, Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 465; Moore,
The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation 77-85; Senator Lewis,
(1935) 79 Cong. Rec. 8297; Taft, The Recall of Decisions (Pamphlet,
1913) pp. 4, 9, 23; Taft, Arizona Veto, (1911) 47 Cong. Rec. 3964; 1
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 29; What Mir.
Hughes and Mr. Stone Once Said, United States News, Feb. 17, 1936,
p. 3; Wilcox, Government by All the People 213; et passim.
U6S. J. R. 3, 15, 149; S. R. 98, S. 3211, 3787; H. J. R. 34, 277, 287,
296, 301, 317, 329, 344, 374; H. R. 7997, 8054, 8100, 8123, 8168, 8309, 9478,
10128, 10196-74th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sessions, Jan. 3, 1935 to Jan. 15, 1936.
17Kansas City Star, Feb. 5, 1937.
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prov'oked by this proposal, it is pertinent to consider the tried and
suggested proposals of the past and present and to compare their
merits and faults.
THE PROPOSALS: IMAKE THE BEST OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
The more conservative reformers would not modify judicial
review of constitutionality but would try to adjust the existing plan
to meet modern needs. In the first place, some offer the reminder
that the constitution has an amending clause. The adoption of the
twenty-first amendment in ten months is cited as a demonstration
that the electorate can readily change the organic law if it wishes
to do so.1 those who have insisted that the constitution is not
easily amended' would reply that the twenty-first amendment was
adopted in a time of frenzied, irrational action, just as was the
eighteenth, that it required eighteen years and a nation-wide cam-
paign to add the sixteenth, and that the rule of difficult amendment
still prevails when sufficient vested interests are at stake.20  Most
American state constitutions 21 and many European constitutions
are more facile of amendment than the constitution of the United
States: for example, in Switzerland a popular majority, provided it
carries also a majority of the cantons, may effect an amendment.22
And now proposed amendments to the federal constitution requir-
ing submission of future amendments to a popular vote are in the
hands of House and Senate judiciary committees. 23
Others in the conservative group hold that the courts have
generally shown a reasonable responsiveness to public opinion, so,
in the words of Goodnow,
"Our only recourse is a persistent criticism of those of their
-' See The Pathfinder, June 15, 1935, p. 1.
'Especially President Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Merriam, Ameri-
can Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 189; and Woodrow Wilson, who once
wrote that it required a near revolution to "move the cumbrous machinery
of formal amendment." Cushman, Amendment, Constitutional, 2 Encyc.
Soc. Sciences 22. Also, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his radio
address, March 9, 1937.
2'For example, the inception of the drive to eliminate child labor by
national regulation antedates the World War, and the proposed amendment
launched in 1924 has received the ratification of only approximately 30 states
in 13 years. Trimble, The Child Labor Problem, (1937) 3 University
Review 208-211.
LiHaines says that the state constitutions should be easily amended,
however, for many are in reality collections of statutes. Haines, American
Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy 487.
-
2Cushman, Amendment, Constitutional, 2 Encyc. Soc. Sciences, p. 22.
23S. J. I' 15, 186, S. 198, H. 3. R. 34 (1935) 79 Cong. Rec. Index
Volume.
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decisions which evince a tendency to regard the constitution as a
document to be given the same meaning at all times and under all
conditions .... 24
This recommendation is also expanded by some to mean a public
and "scrupulous examination" of all nominees for the Supreme
Court,25 while Laski would prefer that the examination and con-
firmation be made by an advisory body, a small professional group,
serving for a long term and free from executive. control." Frank-
furter and Pound would remedy matters by improving upon the
training given lawyers, since judges are of that profession. Thus
the prospective candidates for the bench would receive a thorough
grounding in social and economic problems as well as in the law,
and as a result the courts would become a "bureau of social jus-
tice," with logic relegated to its proper position as a mere instru-
ment.
2 7
Finally two parts of President Roosevelt's proposal belong
in this category. To appoint more federal judges and to assign
them, under the direction of a proctor, to the circuit and district
courts where the dockets are crowded is a conservative answer to
only one criticism of the federal courts-that justice is too slow
and expensive."8  Debate over this plan seems to revolve around
the question whether the federal courts are actually congested with
pending litigation.29 Another part of the president's reform would
extend to the Supreme Court the privilege of retiring on pension,
an inducement that has long been available to other federal judges,
and it would also attempt to encourage or force retirement of all
federal judges at seventy by the appointment of an additional
24Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution 357. Also, Orth and
Cushman, American National Government at pp. 570, 571; Wormser, Court
Reform a Job for Laymen, (1932) 134 Nation 224, 225.25The Supreme Court Under Fire, (1930) 62 New Republic 30, 31;
Moore, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation 77-130.2 6Laski, Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 465.7Pound, Introduction, Supreme Court and Minimum Wage Legislation,
also quoted in Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, at pp. 181,
182. Merriam lends his support (p. 204) and so does Coker, Recent
Political Thought 368, 369, while Frankfurter and Richter have reached
similar conclusions. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Public,
(1930) 83 Forum 333; Richter, A Legislative Curb on the Judiciary,
(1913) 21 J. Pol. Econ. 281-95.28Moves on Supreme Court, and Full Text of Proposed Law, Kansas
City Star, Feb. 5, 1937.29Cummings, Cites the Law's Delay, Kansas City Star, Feb. 5, 1937;
Not as a Dictator, Kansas City Times, Feb. 15, 1937; Lawrence, Refute a
Court Charge, Kansas City Star, Feb. 16, 1937; Otis, Camouflage, or the
President's Message and the Supreme Court (Pamphlet, 1937). Members
of the American Bar Association voted 2 to 1 in favor of this reorganiza-
tion of the federal courts. Kansas City Times, March 12, 1937, p. 6.
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justice either to aid or nullify the work of those who refused to
step aside and make way for the "infusion of new blood." 30  Al-
though the fixing of an arbitrary age of retirement is unfair to
many men who are still "young" at seventy or eighty, that plan
has been generally adopted as the only satisfactory way of meeting
a similar problem in the army, in some industries, in the Civil
Service, and in many universities. Consequently this attempt to
"modernize" the judiciary probably would have been received with
much less adverse criticism had it been divorced from the suspicion
that under present circumstances it was merely an ingenious method
of "packing" the supreme tribunal. 31 Excepting that contingency,32
this move is essentially sound and conservative, especially when
compared with many other suggestions that have been offered.3
Furthermore, it is generally conceded that it is dearly within the
power of Congress to enact all parts of the president's proposal, for
Congress has the constitutional authority to control the size of the
federal judiciary and to regulate its appellate jurisdiction.14
The chief merit of these proposals is that on the whole they
recognize the value of judicial review and offer mild means for
remedying its deficiencies. At the same time they are subject to
the shortcoming that they lack the support of the more radical
camp, which contends that the power of the courts has advanced to
a stage where it is impregnable to moderate appeals and that by
preserving the complete independence of the judiciary these plans
contain the germ that would ultimately defeat their respective
purposes. Considered separately, all three of these approaches
30Moves on Supreme Court, and Full Text of Proposed Law, Kansas
City Star, Feb. 5, 1937.
:"President Roosevelt's radio address, March 9, 1937. Court Debate at
Church, Kansas City Times, Feb. 15, 1937; A Halter on Court, Kansas
City Times, Feb. 22, 1937; Court Issue Hazy, Kansas City Star, Feb. 22,
1937; Otis, Camouflage, or the President's Message and the Supreme
Court (Pamphlet, 1937).
32This and other proposals to "pack" the Court are considered further
at p. 496, infra.
"3The American Bar Association approved retirement privileges for
the Supreme Court by nearly 5 to 1. Kansas City Times, March 12, 1937,
p. 6.
3"The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time-ordain and establish .... In all the other Cases before men-
tioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress
shall make." (secs. 1 and 2, art. III, constitution of the United States).
Also see the testimony of Attorney-General Cummings and judge Devaney,
reported in Kansas City Star, Mar. 10 and 12, 1937; The Pathfinder, Feb.
20, 1937, pp. 3, 4, 14; and other current news, passim.
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have commendable features. Persistent criticism of the courts
and extensive provision of broader legal training would doubtless
have some effect in time, and uniform retirement of federal judges.
on pension, is acceptable per se. Popular, easier amendment,
especially if patterned after the Swiss plan, is sufficiently con-
servative in that it would not disturb judicial functioning, and at
the same time it offers an ultimate means by which the facilities
for keeping the organic law abreast of contemporary need and
popular desire could be improved if meanwhile all other means
should fail or be rejected.
THAT ADVISORY OPINIONS SHOULD BE REQUIRED
Ever since President Washington sought and was refused the
advice of the Supreme Court, it has been the established practice
of the federal courts to refrain from rendering abstract advisory
opinions on the ground that the organic law gave them jurisdic-
tion only in "cases or controversies." 35  Further objectionable
aspects are that the courts desire to look at the administration of
an act as well as its content to determine its intent, and that only in
the hearing of an actual case are all relevant facts and arguments
likely to be unearthed.3 6 However, by 1929 twelve states had pro-
vided that their supreme courts, upon request of the executive or
the legislature, should render advisory opinions on pending pro-
posals, but in only two states are these opinions binding. 7  Never-
theless, it appears that experience in the states is so narrowly re-
stricted as to justify only qualified conclusions as to the probable
favorable results if binding advisory opinions were extensively
sought of the Supreme Court.38  Timeliness of action might be
offset by the objectionable features.
35See 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, at pp.
108-111. The recent rendering of a "declaratory judgment" by the Supreme
Court may mean that the Court would now also hand down abstract ad-
visory opinions if asked, but the two procedures are not identical. Cush-
man, Constitutional Law in 1932-33 (1934) 28 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 47,
48. And see further, as to the recent Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,
the Note (1935) 21 St. Louis L. Rev. 49, 67.36See Murray, Has the Colorado I. R. A. Met an Advisory Death?
(1936) 8 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 141, 142; and bibliography in Robinson, Limita-
tions Upon Legislative Inquiries Under Colorado Advisory Opinion Clause,
(1932) 4 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 237, n. 1.37Willoughby, Principles of Judicial Administration 86; Murray, Has
the Colorado I. R. A. Met an Advisory Death? (1936) 8 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 141, n. 36.
38Elling-vood found that 410 opinions in 8 states to 1918 were received
with full deference (cited in Willoughby, Principles of judicial Adminis-
tration 86, 87), but Robinson has ably reviewed the limitations upon resort
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Since the annulment of the NRA after the Act had been ad-
ministered two years called attention to this clearly undesirable
delay, four resolutions were then introduced in Congress propos-
ing to require advisory opinions of the Supreme Court." Simul-
taneously compromise plans were offered whereby the advantages
in hearing an actual case would not be entirely sacrificed to gain
promptness of decision. These were embodied in two congressional
measures that would provide for direct or immediate review by re-
quiring the Supreme Court to give precedence at once to cases
appealed from courts of first instance because of constitutional
issues.'" Then, in 1937, this was included among the reform
measures advocated by President Roosevelt.41  Since enactment
of this proposal is within the constitutional authority of Congress,42
and since it pursues a middle path between abstract advisory
opinions and present practice, it offers an immediate and con-
servative means of expediting justice ;43 but even so, it alone
would not eliminate five-to-four decisions and other faults charged
to existing practice by critics of the courts.
THAT JUDGES SHOULD BE ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE
If the judiciary is supposed to be truly coordinate with the
other two branches of government, then, by logic, it should be
responsible to the electorate like the others. This was true in
most states, so it was an inevitable result of the twentieth century
movement for more responsive government that the popular elec-
tion of federal judges, for a definite term, should be included in
the program of reformers. In 1914 a nine-district plan was pro-
posed for the election of the nine justices of the Supreme Court,
while district and circuit judges would have been responsible to
the territory they served." The Socialist platform of 1920 and
to the practice as defined by the court in Colorado. Robinson, Limitations
Upon Legislative Inquiries Under Colorado Advisory Opinion Clause, (1932)
4 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 237-50.
:39H. J. R. 317, 344, 374, H. R. 8309, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. There was
also included in Senator Norris's resolution (S.J.R. 149) a requirement
that the Court act within six months if it was to declare a law unconstitu-
tional; but a litigant might purposely delay appeal by resort to technicali-
ties, hence this resolution in effect might also require advisory opinions if
the Court were to act at all. See the editorial, in Boulder, Colo. Daily
Camera, June 18, 1935.
40S. 3211, H. R. 8054, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.4 1 Moves on Supreme Court, and Full Text of Proposed Law, Kansas
City Star, Feb. 5, 1937.2Requirement of direct review would be clearly a regulation of appel-
late jurisdiction (sec. 2, art. III, constitution of the United States).43The American Bar Association voted 2 to I for direct appeal. Kansas
City Times, Mar. 12, 1937, p. 6.
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LaFollette's of 1924 contained clauses favoring the election of
federal judges, in the latter case by direct vote and for ten-year
terms.
45
Advocates of this plan claim that it would make the judiciary
properly responsible to the people they are supposed to serve,40
that it has worked well in the states4" and in Switzerland,'" and
that even if it would make judges stoop to participation in election
campaigns, it would be less disgraceful for them to do that than
to undergo an attack like that of the Senate on Mr. Justice Hughes
in 1930.49 One of the strong points against this panacea is the
contention that the people are "incapable of passing judgment upon
the technical and professional attainments of judicial candidates."50
The opponents also claim that state practice of this plan has
resulted in the election of incapable men ;51 that it involves the
judges in party and machine politics; 2 and that this in turn
eliminates men who do not care to risk their reputation for a
political office 3 and also is not conducive to the independence of
mind of successful candidates, for they must soon seek re-
election. 54  Laski lightly brushed aside the claim for success in
Switzerland by the clever rejoinder that "success in lottery is not
an argument for lotteries. . . ."I' The most valid of all the
unfavorable arguments is based on the fact that in the states, where
the judges are elected, they have annulled legislative acts no less
frequently than the Supreme Court.G As Ralston said, "Fear
of accountability has meant little to them. 5 7  Hence we may con-
clude that extension of this plan to include federal judges would
"4Clark, Government by Judges, Sen. Doc. No. 610, 63rd Cong. 2nd
Sess., ser. 6596 (1914).45Porter, National Party Platforms, pp. 471, 519.46Clark, Government by Judges, Sen. Doc. No. 610, 63rd Cong. 2nd
Sess., ser. 6596 (1914).47Clark, Government by Judges, Sen. Doc. No. 610, 63rd Cong. 2nd
Sess., ser. 6596 (1914).
4SLaski, Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 466.
4gWhen Secrecy is Best, (1930) 59 World's Work 22.
roOrth and Cushman, American National Government 497; Laski,
Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences, p. 466.
S'Buell, Reforming the Supreme Court, (1922) 114 Nation 715.
rOrth and Cushman, American National Government 497.
53Orth and Cushman, American National Government 497.
54Laski, Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 466.
55Laski, Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 466.
56Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet 1932),
Appendix B.
57Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet 1932),
p. 69.
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likewise fail to have the desired effect, and still other means of
checking the courts would be sought.
THAT UNPOPULAR JUDGES SHOULD BE IMPEACHED OR RECALLED
The constitution provides that federal judges shall hold their
office "during good behavior.'" Since what constitutes "good
behavior" is not defined, President Jefferson, who faced a judiciary
packed with Federalists, proposed that a judge should be im-
peached if he failed to defend one of his criticized opinions to the
satisfaction of Congress."9 This agitation came to a climax in the
proceedings against Mr. Justice Chase, but the necessary two-
thirds vote was lacking in the Senate ;60 thereafter it has generally
been conceded that federal judges should be impeached only upon
charges of misdemeanor."'
The recall of federal office-holders was discussed in the consti-
tutional convention; but the idea did not make impressive headway
until long after the impeachment movement had collapsed, and
then the recall was included, along with the initiative and referen-
dum, in the popular movement of the present century.6 2  In the
states that adopted the recall it usually applied only to administra-
tive officers, but nine states also included provision for the recall
of their judges.63 Then the Socialists incorporated in their plat-
form a statement favoring the recall of federal judges, and
organized labor lent its support. 4 However, the only trial to
5"Art. III, sec 1.
59Buell, The Supreme Court in United States History, (1922) 17 Cur-
rent History 230; Orth and Cushman, American National Government 568.
13oBuell, The Supreme Court in United States History, (1922) 17
Current History 230; Orth and Cushman, American National Government
568.
436 Nevertheless, Jefferson's proposal has been revived recently. Ralston,
Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), at p. 70; .and
H. J. R. 301, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935). See also Otis, McAdoo Versus
the Judges, (1936) 5 Kan. City L. Rev. 1.
6 2Bird, Recall, 13 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 147; Munro, The Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall 88.
6aThe American Bar Association opposed this movement. President
Taft vetoed the resolution to admit Arizona until the recall of judges was
erased from the state constitution; but Arizona reenacted the provision
after admission as a state. In Arkansas the recall statute was set aside
by the court. Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, pp. 194, 195;
Wilcox, Government By All the People 213; Ralston, Study and Report
for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), pp. 68, 69; Clark, Government by
Judges, Sen. Doc. No. 610, 63rd Cong. 2nd Sess. ser. no. 6596 (1914) at
p. 72.
64Porter, National Party Platforms 471; Merriam, American Political
Ideas 1865-1917, p. 193. In 1922 Frear of Wisconsin introduced in Congress
a proposed amendment to the Constitution which included the recall for
the federal judiciary. Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L.
(Pamphlet, 1932), p. 72; 2 Cong. Digest 271.
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date has been that of the few states that were receptive to the
suggestion.
Advocates of this panacea claim that it is a useful device for
calling judges to task after rendering unpopular opinions in cases
involving economic issues ;" that it makes all three departments
equal in fact as well as in theory ;6 that it has been sparingly used
in those states that have it ;17 and that the old way was bad, so
this would surely be an improvement, even if not perfect, 8 for
"it would be better to have a just judge recalled than to have a
just law ... unjustly wiped off the statute books." 69  Opponents
contend that the judiciary, instead of being independent, would be
subject to the "popular passion" of "temporary majorities. '70
They point out that judges would then be under pressure to ignore
the rights of minorities or the property interests of intrenched
upper classes, 1 that they would be subservient to party bosses,72
and that they might even be recalled for exercising their legitimate
function without having avoided laws on grounds of unconstitu-
tionality. 73
Any provision limiting the tenure of federal judges could be ef-
fected only by constitutional amendment, for the courts themselves
would probably find an impeachment or recall statute to be in con-
flict with the "good behaviour" clause in the organic law.74 Removal
of judges by either method would also come after the fact; it
would not destroy the decisions that led to the recall of the judges
who made them, and it would not prevent future courts from
making like decisions.7 5 In California and Oregon the recall has
seldom been used against judges, and then because of moral or
procedural laxity rather than decisions affecting constitutional
issues.76 Consequently Barnett, who studied the effect of the pro-
65Bird and Ryan, The Recall of Public Officers ... in California 14.
66Martin, The Veto and the Recall (Pamphlet, 1911), p. 4.
67Bird and Ryan, The Recall of Public Officers . . .in California 347.
GsWilcox, Government By All the People vii.
69Martin, The Veto and the Recall (Pamphlet, 1911), p. 5.
7OMunro, The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 88; Taft, quoted in
Wilcox, Government By All the People 213; Borah, American Problems,
ch. xv; Bird and Ryan, The Recall of Public Officers ... in California 12;
Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, 196.7lMerriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, pp. 193, 195, 196.72Wilcox, Government By All the People 215.73Clark, Government By Judges, Sen. Doc. No. 610, 63rd Cong. 2nd
Sess. ser. no. 6596 (1914), p. 69.
74Ettrude, The Power of Congress to Nullify Supreme Court Decisions
6; Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), p. 76.75Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), p. 69.76Bird and Ryan, The Recall of Public Officers . . .in California 347;
Barnett, .Operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Oregon
202-6.
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vision in Oregon, concluded that the democratic character of the
recall was more responsible for its popularity than the actual
results attained.7 7 Thus one might infer that adoption of the recall
for federal judges would provide the electorate with a fairly harm-
less weapon which, because of the mere satisfaction of having it,
would serve to quiet the clamor for a more radical measure; but
the shortcomings of the plan apparently would make it ineffective
in regard to the power of the courts over constitutional questions.
THAT JUDICIAL DEcIsIoNs SHOULD BE SUBJECT To RECALL
The referendum as applied to judicial decisions was first advo-
cated vigorously by ex-President Theodore Roosevelt in 1912.78
The proposal was embodied in the Progressive platform of that
year, which said that the power of the courts should be restricted to
leave to the people "the ultimate authority to determine funda-
mental questions of social welfare and public policy.179 This was
to be accomplished by providing that in case acts of state legisla-
tures in exercise of their police power should be held unconsti-
tutional by the state courts, the people should have a chance to
vote on the issue after a lapse of reasonable time. The United
States Supreme Court was not to be affected by this limitation.
Colorado was the only state to respond, and its law of 1913 provided
for a sixty-day interval before a constitutional opinion took effect.
If, in that time, a petition were circulated and signed by five per
cent of the voters, an election should be held within ninety days to
give the people a chance to override the decision. 0 But in 1921
the supreme court of that state decided that this amendment con-
flicted with the federal constitution and was consequently void.,'
The arguments for the recall of decisions are few. They in-
clude the insistence that the people are entitled to the final voice
on decisions involving issues vital to them,8 2 and the negative
contention that the ordinary process of amendment is too slow
7 7Barnett, Operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Oregon
218. Likewise, in Vermont where the tenure of judges is least secure, the
courts have exercised their judicial prerogative fearlessly. Goodnow, Social
Reform and the Constitution 340.783Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 189.
7OPorter, National Party Platforms 337.
°
0Bird and Ryan, The Recall of Public Officers . . . in California, p.
16; Munro, Initiative and Referendum, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 52.
81People v. Western Union, (1921) 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146.
12President Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Ransom, Majority Rule and
the Judiciary 6.
83See Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 189.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and difficult and makes possible the thwarting of a simple majority
by a strong minority.83 In opposition, we find the arguments
that this plan in practice would destroy the constitution by laying
it open to ill-considered attacks arising amid "momentary
clamor ;1184 that it would wreck the entire legal system by removing
the stabilizing effect of unchallenged precedents ;" that in view of
the number of opinions involving constitutionality this device
would be worn out by too frequent use ;86 and that it would cause
jiidges to ask the advice of politicians concerning the popular
temper before deciding a case.87 Additional and unique objections
were raised by Stimson. He first claimed that it would be retro-
gressive, a return to methods used of old but later abandoned, and
then he raised the question of just what would be recalled. For
example, the opinion in Lochner v. New York was based, he said,
upon principles embodied in the Magna Charta, the fourteenth
amendment, and the New York constitution. Would recall of
that decision then invalidate all of those documents ?ss
Perhaps the practice of the ordinary referendum, where it has
been used, might yield a clue as to its probable effect if applied
to judicial decisions. When a law is to be voted upon usually
only about half of the voters register, which makes it possible for
a minority of the whole electorate to control the outcome s0 Would
it be otherwise if applied to court decisions, and is the average
citizen adequately versed in the law to arrive at a wise decision?
Of course, if decisions involving major policies rather than legal
technicalities were the only ones submitted to a vote, the people
would at least think they knew what they wanted and vote ac-
cordingly. Nevertheless, the application of the plan to the federal
judiciary would undoubtedly require a constitutional amendment,
since it would be a restriction on procedure rather than on juris-
diction.0 Then to the extent that it did curb the judiciary it
would be more negative than positive; some confusion of the law
would undoubtedly follow; and if the referendum revision were
too easily effected, the resulting extreme facility of amending the
84Taft, The Recall of Decisions (Pamphlet, 1913), pp. 5-9.
85Taft, The Recall of Decisions (Pamphlet, 1913), p. 23.86Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932),
p. 69.87Taft, The Recall of Decisions (Pamphlet, 1913), p. 22.
88Stimson, Certain Retrogressive Policies of the Progressive Party,
(1913) 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 160; Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S.
45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937.
89Munro, Initiative and Referendum, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 52.
DoSee footnote 34.
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organic law might soon shatter the Constitution beyond recogni-
tion.
THAT THE PRESIDENT AND SENATE SHOULD "PACK" THE COURT
It is clearly within the power of Congress to determine the
number of federal judges, so the size of the Supreme Court could
be and has been expanded as Congress saw fit.91 This places with-
in the hands of a given administration the means to "pack" the
highest tribunal. Consequently President Roosevelt's proposal
to appoint an additional justice to work alongside each one who
failed to retire at the age of seventy 92 immediately provoked the
charge that he was packing the Bench, that he was trying to change
umpires in the middle of the game. First, it must be observed
that to "pack" the judiciary may have two definitions. By the
first it means that the President would appoint mere political pup-
pets, "yes-men," who by some sense of obligation to the executive
would follow his bidding and uphold specific statutes regardless of
their own conscientious interpretation of the constitution. By the
second it means that the president would choose for the additional
justices men whose past records indicate that they might reasonably
be expected to interpret the constitution in a way that would
facilitate its further expansion in a manner that would be in
general harmony with the New Deal interpretation of it already
approved in some dissenting opinions of the minority on the
bench."3 The first definition connotes a preposterous perversion
of American constitutional government, and if there was any
justification for the suspicion that the president and Senate were in
collusion to pack the courts with supine puppets, the outcry against
the proposal was deserved. Yet that overlooks the fact that in the
past the Senate has taken seriously its power of confirmation,
especially when it seemed that the president was trying to force
acceptance of his nominees, and the president himself has vigorous-
ly repudiated that definition of "packing" as unworthy of any presi-
O1The number of Supreme Court justices has varied, as follows: six
in 1789, five in 1801, seven in 1807, nine in 1837, ten in 1863, seven in 1866,
and nine since 1869. 1, 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States
History passim; The Pathfinder, Feb. 29, 1937, p. 11.
92Provided also that total number of appointments to the federal courts
should not exceed fifty, and that the number of Supreme Court justices
should not exceed fifteen. Moves on Supreme Court, and Full Text of
Proposed Law, Kansas City Star, Feb. 5, 1937. The American Bar Asso-
ciation vote was 6 to 1 against this feature of the President's plan. Kansas
City Times, Mar. 12, 1937, p. 6.
93President Roosevelt's radio address, March 9, 1937.
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dent and Senate fit for their offices. 94 Pursuit of such a course
would undoubtedly bring political suicide to the party responsible
for it, hence in the further consideration of packing the Court the
second definition will be accepted.
In the debate over this proposal at least three points of view
have appeared:
(1) That the federal judiciary is America's one great non-
partisan governmental agency; to legislate a change in its com-
position is not only to establish a dangerous precedent but also to
undermine the foundations of American checks and balances. 95
(2) That the Supreme Court has been and is packed, and that
the present move is designed merely to "unpack" itY0
(3) That in the last analysis as long as the independence of
judgment of the justices remains unimpaired, it is not possible to
pack the courts with any assurance of unqualified success .
7
To evaluate these divergent views requires a brief review of
the history of the federal judiciary s First, the number of justices
on the Supreme Court has been changed six times in the course
of American history99 and since 1789 Congress has frequently
exercised its power to establish and enlarge the inferior courts.
In one sense, the first federal judiciary was "packed" by President
Washington, who laid down the rule that he would not knowingly
appoint to the offices at his command, including the judiciary, men
"whose political tenets are adverse to the measures wch [sic] the
general government are pursuing." 10  Subsequently President
John Adams appointed John Marshall Chief Justice and named
other Federalists to fill the sixteen judicial posts created in the
closing days of his administration. President Jefferson's effort
94President Roosevelt's radio address, March 9, 1937. Concerning the
past exercise of the Senate's power of confirmation, see The Supreme Court
Under Fire, (1930) 62 New Republic 30, 31; Hacker and Kendrick, The
United States Since 1865, pp. 561, 625; Lingley and Foley, Since the Civil
War 742; Munro, The Government of the United States 187, 280; Garner,
Political Science and Government 798.95Dorothy Thompson, in Kansas City Star, Mar. 12, 1937, p. 8; Senator
Bennett Clark, Kansas City Star, March 14, 1937; and others passim.96Judge Devaney, Kansas City Star, March 12, 1937, p. 1; Professor
Corwin, Kansas City Star, March 17, 1937, pp. 1, 10; The Pathfinder, Feb.
20, 1937, p. 14; and so forth.97The Pathfinder, Feb. 20, 1937, p. 14; Attorney-General Cummings,
Kansas City Star, March 10, 1937, p. 1; Senator Wheeler, Kansas City
Times, Feb. 22, 1937, p. 1; and so forth.98For general references on the subject of this and the succeeding
paragraph, see footnote 1; also Buell, The Supreme Court in United States
History, (1922) 17 Current History 230.
99See footnote 91.
1004 Channing, History of the United States 51-6.
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to "unpack" these courts by impeachment was thwarted by the
Senate,"" and Chief Justice Marshall fortunately remained in
office to give the constitution the federalist interpretation until
1834. Thenceforth to the Civil War a series of Democratic ad-
ministrations packed the Court with state's rights men and this
Court rendered the consequential Dred Scott opinion in 1857. Then
the Republicans sought to repack it in 1867 in favor of their re-
construction program.10 2  President Grant did name friendly ap-
pointees to fill two vacancies in 1871, and the Legal Tender deci-
sion of 1870 was then reversed.
Since 1869 the size of the Court has not been changed, and
the tradition has been created that no further changes should be
made. In this period the persistence of previous partisan affiliation
of the justices was again demonstrated when during the contested
election of 1876 the five justices of the Supreme Court, who had
been selected to make the election commission "impartial," voted
on all counts according to their known partisan inclinations. Their
division three-to-two gave the commission an eight-to-seven Re-
publican majority, and all twenty disputed electoral votes were
given to Hayes. Another relevant point is that from 1921 to
1933 three successive Republican presidents named eight justices
to the Bench,"0' so in that way of looking at it the Court has been
packed again, even if not deliberately. And now there is little
hope of repacking it soon without increasing the number of jus-
tices."" After the annulment of the NRA it was reported that
President Roosevelt had firmly refused to consider proposals that
the Court be packed,1'0 but in the succeeding two years he seems
to have resolved that the combined retirement-enlargement pro-
posal that passed the House in 1869 and was recommended by
Attorney General McReynolds in 1913 was the "most conserva-
tive" and immediate means of bringing the judiciary into harmony
with the other two branches of the government."'
'"'See text at footnote 60.
lO2Harper's Weekly openly advocated packing the Court. Orth and
Cushman, American National Government 491-4.103Editorial, Review of Reviews, March 1937, p. 26. It should also be
recalled that nearly all of the present incumbents participated actively in
politics prior to their appointment. Court Issue Hazy; Kansas City Star,
Feb. 22. 1937.
IO4The normal life expectancy of the youngest of the justices, age 61,
is 13 years, and of the eldest, age 80, is 4 years. Muncie, Ind. Evening
Press, Sept. 6, 1936, p. 6.
1OrNew York Times, Jan. 13, 1935, No. 2, at p. 3; Jan. 31, 1935, N6.
2, at p. 4.
looMoves on Supreme Court, and Full Text of Proposed Law, Kansas
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Nevertheless, this attempt to follow the precedent of George
Washington 07 might not succeed now as well as then. justice
McReynolds, the appointee of President Wilson, a "liberal," be-
came one of the more conservative men on the Bench, while Chief
Justice Hughes, named by President Hoover, a "reactionary," has
been liberal more often than conservative. 1 8 So it seems reason-
able to concede that as long as the justices, conditioned by years
of legal training and experience, have complete independence after
appointment, they will naturally interpret the constitution on the
basis of precedent and obvious authority in a given case, with the
result that a bench of fifteen liberals might nearly as often be
divided eight-to-seven against the administration as one of nine
has been divided five-to-four.0 9
This past history of the Court provides the basis for the con-
clusion that there is some merit in each of the three contentions
mentioned previously, as follows:
(1) The Court is an independent, non-partisan agency in the
main, yet in some crucial cases the previous partisan affiliation of
the justices seems to have conditioned their opinions. But since
neither the purposely nor the inadvertently packed courts of the
past have become fully subservient to the other two branches, nor
have they disregarded the main body of American individual liber-
ties, it does not necessarily follow that another change in the com-
position of the Court would be cataclysmic. Yet if the present
deliberate effort should succeed too well, the practice might be
followed by administration after administration, creating even
greater confusion of legal precedent than already prevails, and
finally reducing the federal judiciary to a political toy. This con-
tingency provides the legal profession with its chief cause for
protest, and also suggests the advisability of effecting this revision
only by amendment, even though Congress clearly has the power
to enact it.
(2) Again, since the Court has been packed before and may
even now be partially packed, this proposal may be explained as an
effort to unpack it in order to bring it into harmony with the inter-
pretation of the constitution held by the other two branches. On
City Star, Feb. 5, 1937; President Roosevelt's radio address, March 9, 1937;
The Pathfinder, Feb. 20, 1937, pp. 3, 4, 11.
107See footnote 100 and text.08See Court Debate at Church, Kansas City Times, Feb. 15, 1937.
l09Senator Wheeler, Kansas City Times, Feb. 22, 1937; Attorney-Gen-
eral Cummings, Kansas City Star, March 10, 1937; The Pathfinder, Feb.
20, 1937, p. 14.
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this score the New Dealers, including farm hnd labor organizations,
hail this move hopefully, while the propertied interests use all
agencies at their command to oppose or delay a change that might
facilitate the renewal of New Deal regulation.
(3) Yet even packed courts of the past have been fairly inde-
pendent, and there is nothing in this proposal to obstruct the inde-
pendence of judgment of even the future liberal appointees. So
there is at least a small chance that even a predoiiiinantly liberal
Court would find a new NRA or AAA unauthorized by the Con-
stitution. Should this eventuality come to pass, it would mean also
that this packing was not fully successful and that consequently
the alarm provoked by the first contention above and the optimism
found in the second were not fully justified.
If one is able to close his ears to the din of this partisan de-
bate, he may fairly conclude that this proposal is neither dreadfully
dangerous nor certainly constructive. This leaves then its ex-
pediency as its chief defense, for it can be tried now without wait-
ing ten or twenty years for the agreement upon and adoption of
an amendment. If in that trial it should have moderate success,
this move would then be recorded as having been a constructive
aid in the evolution of American constitutional democracy; but if
it should succeed absolutely, some check would have to be devised,
probably by constitutional amendment, to limit further packing
of the judiciary; or if it met with poor success, some of the powers
sought by the present administration would yet have to await ap-
proval by amendment. Since most of the real arguments pro and
con are anticipatory, there is little wonder that this proposal has
evoked wide diversity of opinion.
THAT LAWS SHOULD BE ANNULLED ONLY BY AN
EXTRAORDINARY MAJORITY
Since in some crucial cases laws have been held unconstitutional
by a five-to-four vote of the Supreme Court, an act of Congress
to require that it be done only by an extraordinary majority has
been a widely discussed proposal. Resolutions to provide for this
change in procedure were introduced in each Congress during the
1820's and have been presented at frequent intervals since, par-
ticularly in the years following the Income Tax (1895) and second
Child Labor (1922) decisions, and again when New Deal statutes
were avoided." 0  The proposals are similar in intent and sub-
"OBeard and Beard, The American Leviathan 135-; Buell, The Supreme
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stance but vary in detail. Some would require six or seven or eight
of nine votes to annul a law on constitutional grounds, while others
would require a unanimous vote, or would put through an amend-
ment specifically requiring Cong'ess to fix the number as it saw
fit. One or the other of these plans has been adopted in the states
Qf Ohio, North Dakota, and Nebraska.111
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of requiring an extra-
ordinary majority in federal courts is that it would prevent deci-
sions of unconstitutionality when there was a "reasonable doubt."
The Supreme Court itself has said in dicta of past opinions that if
there was any doubt as to the unconstitutionality of a law the
will of the legislature should prevail, and the narrow margins in
five-to-four decisions, especially when wavering and contradictory
as in the two Income Tax cases, allegedly were evidence that the
Court was not following its own precept. 1 2  To many, another
good feature of this plan is that it stands at least a small chance of
being effected without amending the constitution, 113 and supporters
of this contention sometimes cite as a favorable precedent the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in 1930 that Ohio's requirement of an
extraordinary majority did not violate the "due process" and "re-
publican form of government" clauses in the federal constitu-
tion.' 4  The advocates also maintain that this plan would pre-
serve the good features of judicial review;"' that many good laws
would have been saved by it in the past;"-' that in highly im-
Court in United States History, (1922) 17 Current History 230; Buell,
Reforming the Supreme Court, (1922) 114 Nation 715; 2 Cong. Digest
271-8; Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932),
pp. 7f, 74; Boulder, Colo., Camera, June 18, 1935, p. 2; The Pathfinder,
June 1, 1935, p. 8; S. J. R. 149, H. R. 7997, 8054, 8100, 8123, 8168, and
10196, and H. J. R. 287, 74th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess.
"'Maddox, Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio, (1930) 24
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 638.
12Mr. Justice Waite, in Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L.
Ed. 77, cited in Buell, The Supreme Court in United States History,
(1922) 17 Current History 230; Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat.
(U.S.) 213, 6 L. Ed. 606, and income tax cases cited in Clark, Government
By Judges, Sen. Doc. No. 610, 63rd Cong. 2nd Sess. ser. no. 6596 (1914) ;
Rep. McSwain in 2 Cong. Digest 276; Orth and Cushman, American Na-
tional Government 570; Sinking Fund Cases, (1879) 99 U. S. 761, 25 L.
Ed. 504, in Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932),
p. 64; Ramsay, in 79 Cong. Rec. 7729, 7730, (1935).
"'3Ramsay, in 79 Cong. Rec. 7729, 7730 (1935); Senator Borah, in 2
Cong. Digest 277; Buell, The Supreme Court in United States History,
(1922) 17 Current History 230.
"-'Ohio v. Akron Metrop. Park Dist., cited in Corwin, Judicial Review,
8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 461.
11Buell, The Supreme Court in United States History, (1922) 17
Current History 230.
"16Buell, The Supreme Court in United States History, (1922) 17
Current History 230.
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portant matters Congress is held to a two-thirds rule ;"' and that
by our present plan one man can exert more power than Con-
gress and the president,11 which has a further bad effect in that at
times of constitutional controversy the one justice who turns the
tide one way or the other may be sought as a presidential nominee,
with possible mischievous influence on the outcome of pending
cases."
19
In reply to al'eged violation of "reasonable doubt," opponents
of the extraordinary majority say that the Court has handed down
but few five-to-four opinions. 2' They also refute the claim that
Congress has power to regulate the federal courts in that manner,
for it would be a restriction on procedure rather than on appellate
jurisdiction; and the Ohio case, mentioned above, is not a precedent
in interpretation of the federal judiciary article of the constitu-
tion.'- Other charges against it are that it would give the legisla-
ture and the executive too much power ;122 that in five-to-four
decisions it is in reality five and not just one that decides ;121 that
the Court could vote two-to-one against a law and it would still
stand, which in turn would weaken that law and the Court in the
public esteem ;124 and that in the final analysis the size of the vote
is only a pretext for complaint on the part of those who supported
the annulled legislation.Y-5
Further unfavorable aspects are revealed in Maddox's study of
the operation of Ohio's plan. He found that the influence of the
state supreme court in harmonizing decisions of lower courts was
destroyed, as to constitutional questions, for the inferior courts
did not consider themselves bound by a previous reversal by a
117 Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932),
p. 65.
"-Rep. McSwain, in 2 Cong. Digest 276.
"c'Walter Lippmann, in Muncie Evening Press, June 13, 1935.
12uWilliams, in 2 Cong. Digest 276. Ten five-to-four decisions in
seventy. See footnote 3.
-'Beard and Beard, The American Leviathan 135; Ralston, Study
and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), p. 71; Warren, Congress,
The Constitution, and the Supreme Court 213, 214. Chief Justice Hughes
once said, in reference to this proposal, that "It is doubtful to say the least
if Congress would have the constitutional authority. . . ." What Mr.
Hughes and Mr. Stone Once Said, United States News, Feb. 17, 1936, p. 3.2 2"Mr. Justice Stone, as quoted, see footnote 121; editorial, Boulder,
Colo., Camera, June 18, 1935.22 Chief Justice Hughes, as quoted, see footnote 121; Grinnell, in 2
Con. Digest 277.
124Chief Justice Hughes, as quoted, see footnote 121; Williams, in
2 Cong. Digest 276; Warren, Congress, The Constitution, and the Supreme
Court 217.
12 Warren, Congress, The Constitution, and the Supreme Court 217.
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minority in the higher courts. Thus he concluded that "Litigants
may find a law applicable in one jurisdiction while it is void in
another . . .," that "No generally accepted body of principles is
created," and that "The very basis of our system of law is
threatened." '126  The objections of Maddox, accepted in the main,
might be partially obviated if this plan were effective in its more
conservative form, requiring a two-thirds majority instead of
near unanimity. Even so, some confusion of the law might result,
New Deal proponents would have saved few cherished statutes if
this requirement had been in effect during recent years, and this
device proposes to remedy only one of the causes of popular criti-
cism of the Court.
THAT CONGRESS SHOULD BE ENABLED TO OVERRIDE THE COURT
In an address to the delegates of the American Federation of
Labor in convention in 1922, Senator La Follette proposed that
the Constitution be amended to empower Congress by a two-thirds
vote to override an adverse decision of the Supreme Court. 27
The American Federation of Labor went on record in favor of
that revision, and Representative Frear introduced such a resolu-
tion in the House."28 Then the proposal was written into La Fol-
lette's platform of 1924,129 and was debated during the campaign 3
but La Follette's defeat retired the issue until it was revived fol-
lowing the annulment of the NRA.'1
This plan is favored by some because it is "democratic," it
would not completely destroy judicial review, the desired social
legislation could then be enacted, powerful minorities no longer
need be feared, and it would make legislative bodies the final
authority in their own field, which would in turn create greater
popular interest in the work of Congress, making that body more
careful and conservative."32 La Follette urged it because the con-
"
6Maddox, Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio, (1930) 24
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 638, at pp. 645-7.
1"72 Cong. Digest 271; Reprint in 62 Cong. Rec. 9076-82 (1922).
182 Cong. Digest 271.
129Porter, National Party Platforms 519.
130A manual for debaters was published: Ettrude, The Power of Con-
gress to Nullify Supreme Court Decisions.
"'lSee the title of H. J. R. 277 (1935), 79 Cong. Rec. Index Volume.
Also see the summary of an article by Professor Thomas Reed Powell,
in Review of Reviews, Feb. 1937, p. 66.
"32Affirmative arguments in Ettrude, The Power of Congress to Nullify
Supreme Court Decisions 6. See also the arguments for elimination of
constitutional review, infra, p. 506.
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stitution was, he said, founded on the principle that "the will
of the people shall be the law of the land."'133
But this plan really is a short-cut method of amending the con-
stitution, for in effect Congress could do it by a two-thirds vote." 4
Thus it is open to the criticism that if care were not exercised it
would practically end American constitutional government, destroy-
ing the Bill of Rights and the protection afforded minorities. 13-5 Of
course, the legislative bodies of England and France have compar-
able powers, and Congress, like them, would still be subject to
popular control. 13 Yet there is at least a remote possibility that
in a crisis Congress might legally and with popular applause sus-
pend elections and become a closed corporation which in time might
assume irrevocable Fascist powers. Consequently, since this plan
could be made effective only by an amendment to the constitu-
tion,137 it is doubtful whether the electorate would consider it
worth the risking of a cherished heritage. Another clever though
less valid objection is embodied in the question as to how the mere
passing of a "bad law twice could make it a good one?""38 Of
course the answer to that is that Congress does that very thing,
with constitutional sanction, whenever it overrides a presidential
veto.
The chief support of this plan is that it might be the ultimate
and ideal solution for the whole problem if by its adoption Ameri-
can legislative traditions should become improved and stabilized.
The arguments against it include one, the possible abandonment of
the American form of constitutional government, which practically
eliminates further consideration now of this kind of limitation upon
the courts, unless the American people should become more in-
clined than at present toward the adoption of England's form of
elastic constitution.
THAT CONGRESS SHOULD RESTRICT THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURTS
Since past interpretation of the constitution" 9 indicates that
132 Cong. Digest 272.
13"4 Orth and Cushman, American National Government 570.
"'Dawes, in 2 Cong. Digest 275.
136Mr. Justice Stone said it would give the acts of Congress undue
weight as against the rights of states, unless it were applied to state courts
too, and then states and nation would be in rivalry in the extension of
constitutional powers in particular fields. What Mr. Hughes and Mr.
Stone Once Said, United States News, Feb. 17, 1936.
"37Orth and Cushman, American National Government 570.
13"Dawes, in 2 Cong. Digest 275.
"39 See footnote 34.
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Congress may not only create and abolish federal courts but also
restrict their appellate jurisdiction,"10 it has been suggested that
Congress exercise this power. Early in the past century the repeal
of the -part of the Judiciary Act permitting the federal courts to
accept appeals from state courts was advocated;"41 and after the
Civil War Congress was bombarded with like proposals. 142 That
body did pass an act eliminating appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court under the Reconstruction Act of 1867. The Court
recognized that prerogative of Congress by dismissing the case,
but the ensuing criticism of Congress was so severe as to make
unlikely the repetition of this particular alternative. 4 Neverthe-
less some critics of the federal courts would now abolish the juris-
diction of the latter in that class of cases involving constitutional
issues, leaving the courts supreme in the remainder of the field.,,"
The Socialists have campaigned for this since 1912, and organized
labor has contended for it too."' Then in 1935, when the New
Deal was being riddled by the Court, William Green of the
American Federation of Labor and Secretary of Agriculture Wal-
lace revived this proposal, and resolutions were introduced in
Congress to effect it,14 some by congressional act and some by
constitutional amendment." 7
"40 Orth and Cushman, American National Government 491-4.
"'1Orth and Cushman, American National Government 568; Buell, Re-
forming the Supreme Court, (June, 1922) 114 Nation 715.
142Buell, Reforming the Supreme Court, (1922) 114 Nation 715.
13 The case was Ex parte McCardle, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506, 19
L. Ed. 264, cited in Orth and Cushman, American National Government
494. Also in The Francis Wright, cited by Goodnow, Social Reform and
the Constitution 374.
14"This, on the ground that the power was not intended by the Consti-
tutional Convention, but was usurped by the courts. See footnote 1 and
text.
"14Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 191; Ralston, Study
and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), p. 1; Porter, National
Party Platforms 367, 471.14GEditorial, Muncie, Ind., Evening Press, June 17, 1934, p. 4; New
York Times, Jan. 26, 1935, No. 16, at p. 2. Of eight 1935 resolutions, four
would eliminate all review in cases involving constitutionality, while four
others would reserve the power to review such cases exclusively in the
Supreme Court. S. J. R. 149, H. J. R. 287, 296, 301, 329, and H. R. 8054,
9478, and 10128, 74th Cong. 1st and 2nd Sess.
1470f the four measures to abolish such review, two were bills and two
were proposed amendments. The four proposals to lodge the power ex-
clusively in the Supreme Court were similarly divided. See footnote 146.
Although the Court once approved a similar legislative limitation on its
jurisdiction (see footnote 143), many who consider this suggestion an-
ticipate that it would now have to be adopted through amendment as the
present Court would probably reject it as a restriction on judicial power,
rather than on jurisdiction. Richter, A Legislative Curb on the Judiciary,
(1913) 21 J. Pol. Econ. 291; Orth and Cushman, American National
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Advocates of this extreme measure contend that the wording
of the constitution indicates that Congress was intended to be
supreme in this field; and they maintain that this body is not only
responsible to maintain the constitution but is also responsible to
the people, and that such responsibility, if usurpation by the Court
were ended, would breed care on the part of legislators.'4 8  Besides,
foreign governments get along well without judicial review like
ours, and even if the change would place considerable power in
the hands of Congress and the president, that power would not be
abused, as is testified by the president's discreet exercise of his
command of the army and navy."4  In reply to charges of usurpa-
tion, opponents of this plan resort to the usual claim that constitu-
tional review is an inherent function of the judiciary.150 Then they
point out the evils that would accrue. It would mean the "end of
the constitution.""' Congress, easily swayed by mass movements,
would be less likely to protect the peoples' liberties, 15 2 the states
would all be "vassals" of Washington, 153 the president would be-
come "a dictator,"'15 4 and there allegedly would be forty-eight
varying constructions of some federal laws. 5 ' This proposal in-
vokes all the arguments for and against constitutional review, it-
self, since the whole doctrine is at stake. When it comes to that,
those who defend the courts seem to be on firmer ground than
their opponents, and the elimination of the faults charged to the
present system, with the resultant preservation of the intrinsic merit
of judicial review of constitutionality, recommends itself as a better
plan of approach.
However, limitations on jurisdiction might include something
else instead of a mere elimination of review in a certain class of
Government 569; Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution 348; Buell,
The Supreme Court in United States History, (1922) 17 Current History
230; Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), p. 70.
judge Otis has written some interesting comments on the possibilities of
evading constitutional limitations, in It Can Be Done, United States News,
Feb. 10, 1935, at pp. 3, 14.
14"Rep. Monaghan, in 70 Cong. Rec. 8266, 8565 (1935) ; Senator Ladd,
in 2 Cong. Digest 274; Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L.
(Pamphlet, 1932), p. 73.
149Ralston, Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932),
p. 73.
15'Orth and Cushman, American National Government 569.
"I'Schaffer, in 2 Cong. Digest 274.
1riWarren, Congress, The Constitution and the Supreme Court 174-7.
"'3Schaffer, in 2 Cong. Digest 274; Buell, The Supreme Court in
United States History, (1922) 17 Current History 230.
1'Editorial, Muncie, Ind., Evening Press, June 17, 1935.
"'Buell, The Supreme Court in United States History, (1922) 17
Current History 230; Shields, in 2 Cong. Digest 273.
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cases, so a number of other suggestions have been made.156 Since
the federal courts have shown a tendency of late to go to extremes
in their reliance upon the "due process" clauses,1 57 and in view of
the criticism of that trend by a conservative like Charles Warren,'
the amendments proposed by Senators Costigan and Borah offhand
seem to offer a constructive plan of revision.159 One would give
Congress and the other the states the power to regulate hours,
wages, and the practices of industry and commerce, and both pro-
pose to limit court construction of "due process" clauses to "the
methods or procedure to enforce such legislation" as distinguished
from the substance of the legislation itself. In other words, that
clause would be 'restricted to have a meaning more like what was
popularly accepted at the time of its enactment. 00 Yet neither
proposal would eliminate five-to-four decisions and other grounds
for criticism, and the blanket authority in Costigan's amendment
while necessary to permit needed social legislation, may not be
sufficiently well-defined to prevent possible over-centralization of
governmental control.""' Furtheimore, this redefinition of due
p -cess would deprive the Court of its best weapon for the elimina-
tion of excessive and confused regulation of business in the
separate states, like that in the era of the Granger laws.
Other plang for limiting the jurisdiction of the courts would
provide substitute bodies in an effort to offset the weaknesses that
might result from otherwise negative proposals. The editor of
the New Republic would have us set up an independent "Su-
preme Planning Council," made up of experts in social and
economic management.1 2 In matters of policy the rulings of that
body would take precedence over court opinions, thereby removing
from court jurisdiction a field in which the criticized quasi-
156 The proposal to eliminate the rule of precedent, or stare decisis,
while constructive in that it would attempt to make the courts interpret
the law in the light of the dynamic present rather than on the basis of past
decisions, hardly merits consideration, for the rule is so well ingrained that
judges probably would be somewhat influenced by it in spite of any written
admonition. Merriam, American Political Ideas 1865-1917, p. 179; Ralston,
Study and Report for the A. F. of L. (Pamphlet, 1932), p. 70.
"67See footnote 5 and text.
"5SQuoted in Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Public, (1930)
83 Forum 334.
"5Costigan's proposal, Denver Rocky Mountain News, May 28, 1935,
p. 8; S. J. R. 3, 74 Cong. 1st Sess. Borah's proposal, The Pathfinder,
March 13, 1937, pp. 5, 6; An Amendment, in Kansas City Star, Feb. 25,
1937.
16OHacker and Kendrick, The United States Since 1865, p. 198.
I 6Proves Too Much, Denver Rocky Mountain News, May 28, 1935,
p. 5.
'
6
-
2 Newv Republic, June-12, 1935, at p. 118.
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sociological opinions of the past have originated and in which
long-range planning is essential to further progress. Another
device, similar in essence, has been proposed by Laski.' Instead
of a planning council he would set up administrative courts to
consider cases involving the activities of administrative officials
in their official capacity. These would be made up of social and
economic experts and required to give prompt decisions. He
points to the Conseil d'Etat in France, which has shown "the
highest qualities of a great court of law" in those extremely
technical contemporary problems wherein our own courts can
show only an "unhappy" record.'1 4 But if the people of the United
States were to try this plan, and they already have it in a small
way in the various governmental commission courts, they would
likely insist that this court be an independent body, which inci-
dentally would then be as free to be arbitrary as is the federal
judiciary."' If either this court or a planning council were to
be supreme in their fields, in order not to be subject to over-
ruling by the Supreme Court, to erect either would probably
require an amendment of the constitution, 6" and then another
problem undoubtedly would arise from the frequently overlapping
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the rival administrative
agency.
SUIMMARY AND CONCLUSION
judicial interpretation is in some respects beginning to check
rather than to aid the further growth of the constitution, and
especially is this true when applied to the expansion of national
control in the economic and social fields. Although the courts may
have been legally right in many cases, even some conservatives
have seen in the last presidential election the unofficial ratification
of a "new amendment," one that "charges the national government
I"rLaski, Judiciary, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 465, at pp. 467, 468.
",Garner's Study of the French judiciary, cited in Laski, Judiciary,
8 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 465; and Garner, Political Science and Government
785-91.
'
0 5 There has been committed in the Senate a bill (Senator Logan), S.
3787, that would consolidate the courts of claims, customs, and patent ap-
peals into one administrative court, which would also be given the present
mandamus jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Court and the jurisdic-
tion of tax appeals now exercised by the circuit courts of appeals. The new
court would be independent and its decisions would be subject to review
by the Supreme Court. It would not, however, have jurisdiction in semi-
sociological controversies, as sought by Laski. McGuire, The Proposed
United States Administrative Court, (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 197-202.
" ",The establishment of either of these independent tribunals might
or might not be interpreted merely as a regulation of and limitation upon
the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts. See footnote 34.
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with responsibility for the economic conditions under which our
citizens live and work."' 67  The first problem then is to determine
in what manner the obligations attending that responsibility are to
be met, and that decided, the next step is to conclude how the
desirable features of that program may be safely but certainly
validated by constitutional amendment or enlightened judicial
interpretation. A number of plans have been offered, and in the
individual consideration of them several questions or criteria of
evaluation have been suggested. In the following summary, in
which the sixteen proposals are numbered in the order in which
they have been discussed, four questions or tests are applied in an
effort to arrive at general conclusions. This classification is not
absolute, because some of the plans might readily be moved to
another column by rejecting or accepting their qualifying pro-
visions noted previously. (The salient features of the reform pro-
posed by President Roosevelt are designated by an asterisk.)
(a) WHICH PLANS WOULD PRESERVE THE AccEpm FEATURES OF Ju-
DICIAL FUNCTIONING IN THE AMERICAN FRAME OF GOVERNMENT?
Yes Doubtful No
1. Facile amendment 5. Abstract advisory 10. Recall decisions
2. Criticism and edu- opinions 13. Congress override
cation 7. Elect judges courts
*3. Additional and 8. Impeach judges 14. Deny courts con-
roving justices 9. Recall judges stitutional juris-
*4. Retirement pr iv- *11. Pack the courts diction
ileges 12. Extraordinary 16. Supreme policy-
*6. Immediate review majority to annul forming or ad-
15. Redefine due laws ministrative
process tribunals
(b) WHICH WOULD PRODUCE GREATER ELASTICITY IN THE ORGANIc LAW?
Extremely Effective Moderately or Ulti- Doubtful
mately Effective (or other purpose)
10. Recall decisions 1. Facile amendment *3. Additional and
13. Congress override 2. Criticism and roving justices
courts education *4. Retirement
14. Deny courts *11. Pack the courts - privileges
constitutional 12. Extraordinary 5. Abstract advisoryjurisdiction majority to annul opinions
16. Supreme policy- laws *6. Immediate review
forming or ad- 7. Elect judges
ministrative 8. Impeach judges
tribunals 9. Recall judges
15. Redefine due
process
'
6 7 Leonard Ayres, quoted and supported with qualifications, in editorial,
Kansas City Star, Dec. 27, 1936. Naturally, the President would interpret
the election as "mandate" to act "now." Radio address, March 4, 1937. It
is not within the scope of this article to investigate and determine whether
the conclusion is absolutely justified that the last election constituted a
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(c) WHICH WOULD EXPEDITE JUSTICE?
Extremely Effective
5. Abstract advisory
opinions
Moderately or Ulti-
mately Effective
*3. Additional and
roving justices
*6. Immediate review
15. Redefine due
process
16. Supreme policy-
forming or ad-
ministrative
tribunals
Doubtful
(or other purpose)
1. Facile amendment
2. Criticism and
education
*4. Retirement
privileges
7. Elect judges
8. Impeach judges
9. Recall judges
10. Recall decisions
*11. Pack the courts
12. Extraordinary
majority to
annul laws
13. Congress override
courts
14. Deny courts
constitutional
jurisdiction
(d) WHICH COULD BE EFFECTED WITHOUT RESORT TO A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT, IF EXPEDIENCY BE CONCEDED DESIRABLE?
No Amendment
Required
2. Criticism and
education
*3. Additional and
roving justices
*4. Retirement
privileges
*6. Immediate review
*11. Pack the courts
Doubtful
12. Extraordinary
majority to annul
laws
14. Deny courts
jurisdiction
16. Supreme policy-
forming or
administrative
tribunals
5. Abstract advisory
opinions
Require Amendment
1. Facile amendment
7. Elect judges
8. Impeach judges
9. Recall judges
10. Recall decisions
13. Congress override
courts
15. Redefine due
process
Those whose chief interest in these projected revisions is ex-
pressed by any one of these questions alone will be inclined to
reject or accept upon the basis of that single test, but sound con-
clusions must be based upon a synthesis of the four concepts or
a comparison of the first columns under (a) and (d) with the
center and right columns under (b) and (c). Once more it
becomes clear that the chief issue is that of expediency against
the long-range view. The president's plan scores well in all re-
spects under the fourth test, or expediency, and its doubtful
features under the second and third are immaterial; but the
mandate to the administration, to legislate its social and economic objectives
into effect, and whether the trends in American life require greater federal
control, as held by most economists and sociologists. Instead, it is assumed
that the virtue of elasticity in the organic law in the past century means
that continued elasticity is desirable, preferably by judicial interpretation,
in so far as is possible.
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questionable aspect of the "packing" feature under the first criterion
might, if carried into effect with extreme success, require later
constitutional limitation upon resort to it. Some say that for that
reason this feature should not even be enacted; others maintain
that it can be tried with no more danger than has attended previous
experience with packed courts. Only by actual trial of it could
the accuracy of either contention be determined.
When the perplexed layman scans the list for further devices
that are certain to be effective and are clearly within the powers
of Congress, he finds no solution for the problem. Of course, if
resort must be had to amendment, everything on the list becomes
available for consideration and a number of promising combina-
tions might then be arranged. However, any amendment affecting
the courts would face the vociferous opposition of the groups that
now decry President Roosevelt's attack, and adoption could come
only after a long-fought nation-wide contest in which both the
courts and the sponsoring administration would again be exposed
to the abuse characteristic of such campaigns.
While the prospect of revising court powers by changing the
organic law is being considered, at least two other alternatives
should be kept in mind. One is that by means of a similar cam-
paign an amendment might also be sought giving Congress blanket
power to legislate most Democratic objectives into effect. But a
delegation of broad power so far-reaching would threaten the
abolition of the remaining good features of American dualism;
consequently this alternative in fact would probably call for a
series of campaigns that would attempt to obtain the ratification
of one amendment after another. After several decades Congress
probably would be delegated the clearly defined power to legislate
on a national scale in several economic and social fields wherein the
need had by then become so obvious that minority resistance had
finally been overcome. That prospect reverts one's attention to
the fundamental problem of the elasticity of the present consti-
tution. Judicial interpretation has made possible the long preserva-
tion and application of an organic law written in general terms.
This elasticity of interpretation President Roosevelt would revive
immediately by exercise of the powers residing in the chief execu-
tive and Congress. If his proposal should be defeated because of
the fear that it might prove unsound in other respects, an amend-
ment affecting the power of the courts might then be sought. Rather
than take that issue into the national arena again, and rather than
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postpone solution of the conceded pressing problems of the nation
pending the tardy adoption in the remote future of a series of
amendments, another, or the second, alternative merits considera-
tion.
If the recent disagreement of the Court and Congress definitely
means that the constitution is now too inflexible to permit applica-
tion by interpretation to modern and future needs, clear and timely
delegation of powers to the federal government, as needed, seems
preferable to any serious impairment of the functions of the
judicial branch. 0 8 But if a series of intricately defined amendments
must then be appended to the national constitution, making it
comparable to many of the state constitutions, an amendment might
first be adopted to effect greater facility of the amending process
itself, which is already an accepted feature of state practice. A
requirement that future amendments be ratified by a popular
majority, comprising also a majority of the states, probably would
facilitate a more timely delegation of powers to Congress, if and
when needed, without making the organic law too vulnerable to
minority pressure and popular caprice. At the same time the
subsequent amendments would serve as a clear mandate to the
judiciary in its consideration of cases involving national policy in
those fields of legislation.
'
0 SThis was written before the announcement on March 29 that the
Supreme Court had reversed its recent decisions concerning some state
police powers and one national power. Those reversals may hearten the
conservatives who contend that this more liberal interpretation has destroyed
the best argument for the president's proposals, but they also offer con-
vincing evidence that the social and economic legislative policies in states
and nation have little chance of attaining stability when subject to review by
a vacillating Court. Consequently the concluding alternative presented here
seems yet to have some merit.
